French vs Burgundians (1430)

The Battle of Wassy, Champagne 1430

Outnumbered and outscouted, the Burgundians also have only one unit of knights. They do however count numerous archers with both longbow and stakes (Picards and English).

The Prince of Orange is able to impose his choice of battlefield on the over-eager French. They choose a site with hills on either flank, and a vineyard between them. This is a strong defensive position, as archers on the hill will be able to shoot up to 40cm distant.

Picardy and Flemish archers and crossbowmen line the hill on the Burgundian left, English longbowmen hold the right, and the gap between the hill and the vineyard is defended by foot knights and Flemish pike. The French plan is to unlock the centre by forcing the Burgundian right. They decide to throw 3 units of mounted crossbowmen and a unit of voulgiers against this hill, accompanied by cavalry and light infantry. If they can take the hill, the Burgundians will have to withdraw onto the second hill and risk being surrounded.

Unfortunately for the French, the two generals commanding the troops on the left are completely bogged down. A shallow stream, with numerous fords, is quickly crossed, but the French leaders are unable to spur their troops forward. The superior range of the English on the hill has arrows quickly falling amongst the milling French, causing great confusion.

The Burgundian valets sent towards the right flank are a continual threat, the French varlets paralysed and unable to see them off. Cavalry charges and evades succeed one another.

An hour into the battle (turn 3) the Duc d’Anjou decides to advance his numerous knights into range of the Picards on the hill, ready to exploit any opportunity. The knights come under heavy fire : twenty minutes later, they have lost an element, are in disorder, and are being driven back towards their initial positions. At the same time, the concentration of French crossbow fire forces the English momentarily off the hill, but they will quickly return. During these moments of respite, however, the French are able to shoot the Burgundian cavalry in the flank and force them off the battlefield, onto which they do not return. It is nonetheless obvious to the French that they are not going to take the hill before weariness sets in (battle restricted to 7 turns).

Having reached the foot of it, they are once more driven back when the English crest the hill-line, and pour down once more their disciplined fire, led by a general with the "skilled shooter" capacity. Even if the hill falls, the knights will never be able to move up into support. The French therefore call off the attack on turn 5. There has not been a single hand-to-hand combat, archery fire has been critical in this battle.

The result is a draw.  Battlefield losses are only one element of knights and one element of light infantry.

French vs. Burgundians (1430)

Battle of Chateau Thierry, Champagne 1430

Battle played with DSC.

The French have greater numbers, but lack heavy troops. They outscout the Burgundians (4-0).

The differential of 4 scouting points was used for a +1 order for two French generals on the first turn – which sadly proved useless.

The centre was occupied by a farm and orchard, in DSC terms a "Wood" which turned out to be sparse. On the Burgundian right flank was a second wood, creating a bottleneck, and on the left were two gentle hills.  The Burgundians deployed their knights in two locations : on the right, and between the hills and the farm. Their left flank was composed of HI archers and EHI foot knights.

The Marshal of Burgundy changed his battle plans after seeing French deployment. His orders were to stall on the left – or let the French knights come and then counterattack – ;shield off the centre with crossbowmen; and envelop on the left.

It was planned that the left flank eventually sweep round behind the farm and either encircle its occupants or pincer the French left.
As for the French, they amassed all of their knights on their left flank. The farm was left to the mass of MI archers and the spearmen. The right flank, inteded to screen, was made up of heavy cavalry, medium and light infantry and some mounted crossbowmen. The French planned on crushing all resistance with their knights, with the troops in the farm threatening and paralysing any Burgundian intervention.

The French right was however surprisingly successful from the outset. Against the ranks of enemy crossbows installed on the hill - and firing with a 35 cm extended range - the French general chose to send his MI and LI. The LI, carelessly ignored by the Burgundians, begin to get flank shots leading to considerable confusion and disorder.  With the Burgundian foot knights too slow to intervene, the French MI were able to close in on the enemy crossbowmen. Expecting a massacre, the French unfortunately chose to alter their entire battle plan, and hold off the assault on the other flank until decision was reached on the right.

An hour into the battle (turn 3), everything went wrong for the French. The attack on the Burgundian positions on the right was a miserable failure, a powerful volley calmly directed by unit officers winning the melee for the Burgundians.  The Gascon MI, who had relied on rear support for victory, now recoiled back into their comrades, disordering everyone. On turn 4, the pursuit by the Burgundian crossbowmen destroyed these hapless south-westerners.

In the centre, the French took a gamble, using initiative to send a unit of heavy cavalry against enemy knights, whilst attempting to bring Gascons out of the farm and onto their flank. This was a bold attempt, but badly coordinated (failed order). The Gascons did not receive the second instructions ordering the flank charge. Left at the mercy of a far superior adversary, the French heavy cavalry were swept aside; the Gascons, milling in confusion out in the open, will be cut down on turn 4. By the end of turn 3, the French right was "moral aggravé 1" and it was decided to shift knights from the left to the centre, ending all hope of a victorious charge.

On turn 4, the Burgundian knights unleashed their charge in the centre. This overran the two French mounted crossbow HI XB units, one on foot and unable to evade, the other mounted but disordered and with poor morale (evade as EHC, ie. 8cm minus 2D6).  This was enough to break the French right, which promptly fled the battlefield.

The French knights moving towards the centre were however able to limit the damage, thanks to the "Valeur Stratégique" of their C-in-C, which enabled them to receive three successful orders, despite proximity to the enemy. Their charge crushed a unit of Burgundian knights and knocked around their French-speaking allies, leading the Burgundian centre to become "moral aggravé 1". Unable because of this state to counterattack by initiative, and with orders failing to get through, the Burgundian onslaught was halted.

Minor Burgundian victory.

French vs. Burgundians (1430)

Battle of Montmort, Champagne 1430

This battle was played out with DSC.  I believe it was my first game using this ruleset.

This battle was a brief and brutal affair. The initial French plan was to entice forward the Burgundians, and then seize on their left flank via the woods.

Unfortunately, the commander of the right wing was paralysed for the first two turns of the battle. On the left, the French knights had advanced too far forward to rein in.  A concentration of bow fire on the right, including the Spanish in the woods, decimated the Flemish pikemen, but the left could wait no longer. Its commander preferred to charge the Burgundians before they charged him.

A wave of steel crashed into a wall of iron, as several thousand horses thundered over the plain. Four rounds of combat were fought. One unit of French knights had startling success, crushing its Burgundian adversaries, then rolling over a hapless unit of Flemish crossbows. The other, however, failed dismally : and in so doing, left the French commander-in-chief exposed to the wrath of the enemy (he was leading the unit).

At the end of the turn, the Burgundians were only a half point away from rout; as for the French, the loss of their C-in-C saw them flee immediately from the field.

Mycèniens contre Amorites (vers -1750)

MYCENES
A L'ATTAQUE !

Règle utilisée : DSC

Jusqu’alors, la seule action vue par l’armée Amorite était des manœuvres d’entraînement à DSC dans le cadre d’une coopération syro-égyptienne. Le roi Amorite Zimri-Lee de Mari répondit donc avec entrain à l’appel de son cousin, le roi de Qatna : des envahisseurs à l’apparence barbare avait fait une apparition sur le littoral syrien. Il transpira qu’il s’agissait d’une armée Mycénienne, qui avait quitté l’acropole d’Isengard et sa ville de Bruz pour troubler le pays de la Marne (affluente méconnue de l’Euphrate). A leur tête, le redoutable Agapascalon.

Zimri-Lee rassembla donc son armée, dont la venue indiscrète était connue de loin par l’immense nuage de sable qu’il leva dans son train.  Agapascalon put alors reconnaître le déploiement de l’adversaire, et se disposer en fonction (2x points de reco). Tirant profit d’un tell, Zimri-Lee déploya au centre son infanterie lourde, dont deux unités d’archers.

A gauche, il fit déployer le pihrum nomade avec sa nombreuse infanterie moyenne. Craignant les chars ennemis, leur objectif était la zone de terrain difficile devant eux, d’où ils devraient verrouiller le flanc ouvert du centre Amorite.

A droite, enfin, les hordes des Guti, ceux qui ont une face de chien et qui dévorent le pays comme une nuée de sauterelles (joués pour l’occasion, avec l’aval d’Agapascalon, en Horde impétueux 0, pour mieux refléter leur réputation en Sumer et Akkad).

Agapascalon profita de son côté d’un imposant piton rocheux pour déployer de nombreux archers lourds. Le centre regroupait plusieurs unités de fantassins lourds en rangs serrés, appuyés par quelques chars légers. A droite, d’autres unités lourds et un grand nombre de chars prirent place. De part et de l’autre, les deux camps jetèrent en avant leurs javeliniers et leurs archers, combattants pour la majorité peu enthousiastes.

Sur la gauche Amorite, les nomades ont réussi à bloquer le progrès des chars adversaires et ainsi éviter au centre, à part quelques incidents localisés, des tirs de flanc désorganisateurs. Malheureusement le commandement de ce flanc a manqué singulièrement d’élan ; avec la confusion semée dans ses propres rangs par les tirs des chars adverses, le pihrum nomade ne joua aucun autre rôle dans la bataille.

A droite, la situation fut également difficile pour Zimri-Lee. Si leurs archers ont détruit sur le coup le seul char ennemi dans le secteur, et leurs javeliniers ont fait fuir l’infanterie légère ennemie, l’avance de la masse des Guti fut lent et pénible. A cause de cela, ils ont essuyé tir sur tir de la masse d’archers sur la colline et n’ont guère intervenu dans le combat. Zimri-Lee nota, pour de futurs engagements, à quel point une colline tenue par de nombreux archers peut représenter un point d’ancrage quasiment inébranlable.

C’était au centre que le roi Amorite a failli emporter la décision. Ses troupes étaient campés sur la colline lorsque Zimri-Lee nota, avec un intérêt grandissant, que le centre mycénien s’était imprudemment divisé en deux groupes bien distincts et séparés par un espace conséquent.  Sans hésitation, il ordonna une avancée générale, qui frappa le Grec de plein fouet, ruinant plusieurs unités et rendant le centre moral aggravé 1.

La partie droite du centre mycénien se trouva ainsi isoleé, et le plan de Zimri-Lim, dans un deuxième temps, était de rappeler le pihrum nomade vers le centre pour le prendre de flanc, tandis que les lourds l’acheva. Malheureusement, tout ne se passa pas comme prévu. Comme il a déjà été noté, les nomades sur le flanc gauche Amorite, peut-être corrompus par quelques agitateurs benjaminites, ont refusé tout ordre de marche.

Il incombait donc au roi mycénien de charger le premier, aidé par deux chars qui avaient réussi à infiltrer les lignes. Sous le choc, la Garde amorite s’effondra, entraînant avec lui l’unité à ses côtés, et rendant le centre Amorite moral aggravé 2.

Dès lors, le coup de grâce ne pouvait être loin. Les Amorites étaient à deux socles de perdre le corps du général en chef. Zimri-Lee comprit qu’il s’était aventuré ce jour bien trop loin des terres de sa déesse titulaire, Eštar. Lorsque son armée débanda, il avait déjà pris discrètement la fuite.

Une bataille âprement contesté. Les deux collines se sont prouvées de très puissantes positions autour desquels chaque armée a pu s’articuler. La charrerie mycénienne a été globalement neutralisée, mais l’amovibilité des troupes auxquelles cette mission a été confiée à coûté cher à Zimri-Lee.

Merci à Pascal pour une partie de figurines agréable, jouée intensément mais dans la bonne humeur et autour d’une règle géniale : vive DSC ! ; )